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NOTES
RAVIN REVISITED: DO ALASKANS
STILL HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO POSSESS MARIJUANA
IN THE PRIVACY OF THEIR
HOMES?
This Note takes a fresh look at the Alaska Supreme Court’s 1975
decision Ravin v. State that declared a state constitutional privacy
right to possess marijuana in the home for personal use.  It first
reviews Ravin and discusses its importance for Alaska constitu-
tional law.  Next it examines the Voter Initiative of 1990 that at-
tempted to overrule Ravin and finds that the Initiative is uncon-
stitutional unless the factual premises upon which Ravin were
based are no longer valid.  The Note then re-examines those fac-
tual premises and argues that they are in fact still valid and that
therefore, Ravin should still be respected as good law.  It con-
cludes by discussing various ways in which Alaska can remedy the
current tension between Ravin and the Voter Initiative.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Ravin v. State is one of the most well-known and controversial
decisions ever rendered by the Alaska Supreme Court.  In that
1975 opinion, the court held that the Alaska Constitution protects
a privacy right to possess marijuana in the home for personal use.
In 1982, the Alaska legislature codified Ravin by legalizing posses-
sion of up to four ounces of marijuana in a private place.  How-
ever, in 1990, Alaska voters adopted a Voter Initiative that re-
quired the legislature to re-adopt the pre-Ravin flat prohibition on
possession of marijuana, even in a private place.
Eight years after the passage of the Voter Initiative, it is still
unclear whether private marijuana possession is legal under
Alaska law.  This Note revisits Ravin in an attempt to shed some
 Copyright © 1998 by Alaska Law Review
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light on the issue.  Part II describes Ravin and compares it to the
decisions of courts in other jurisdictions that have faced a similar
issue.  Part III documents the prominence of Ravin, both in
Alaska’s constitutional jurisprudence and in state constitutional
law more generally.  Part IV examines the Voter Initiative of 1990,
and concludes that it should not successfully recriminalize mari-
juana unless Ravin is found to have been based on invalid scientific
premises.  Part V looks at the constitutional principles that the
Alaska Supreme Court established in Ravin for determining
whether an invasion of privacy by the state is justified, while Part
VI reviews the current scientific evidence on marijuana.  Ulti-
mately, the Note argues that the factual bases upon which Ravin
was decided are still valid.  Part VII ponders the various legal
methods by which the current situation can be resolved.  Finally,
the Note concludes by arguing that, despite the Voter Initiative of
1990, Ravin should be respected as good law today.
II.  RAVIN V. STATE
A. A Landmark Decision
In Ravin v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court was asked to de-
cide the constitutionality of an Alaska statute proscribing the pos-
session and use of marijuana.1  Irwin Ravin was arrested and
charged with possession of marijuana.  Ravin filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that his right to privacy, as protected by both the
U.S. and Alaska Constitutions, includes the right to possess mari-
juana for personal use.2  The motion was denied by both the dis-
trict and superior courts, and Ravin appealed to the Alaska Su-
preme Court.3
The Alaska Supreme Court first reviewed the principal
United States Supreme Court opinions dealing with the right to
privacy and concluded that they do not recognize any privacy right
to possess marijuana, because “the federal right to privacy only
arises in connection with other fundamental rights.”4  The court did
not stop there however – it conducted a separate inquiry into the
1. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 496 (Alaska 1975).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. Id. at 498-500 (analyzing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(statute barring dispensation of birth control information struck down on privacy
grounds); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (state conviction for possession
of obscene material overturned as violating first and fourteenth amendments);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (restricting protection of Stan-
ley holding to the home)).
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extent to which the Alaska Constitution protects privacy.5  In a
previous decision, Breese v. Smith,6 the court had declined to de-
cide whether a school-imposed hair-length regulation violated the
federal constitution,7 but nevertheless held that the regulation was
prohibited by the Alaska Constitution.8  The Breese court reasoned
that “the right ‘to be let alone’ – including the right to determine
one’s own hairstyle in accordance with individual preferences and
without interference of governmental officials and agents – is a
fundamental right under the constitution of Alaska.”9  Soon after
Breese, Alaska amended its constitution to establish that “[t]he
right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be in-
fringed.”10  Based on Breese and the new state constitutional provi-
sion, the court in Ravin recognized that the Alaska Constitution,
unlike the federal constitution, protects privacy, or the “right to be
let alone,” as an independently existing right.11
Despite recognizing the specific guarantee of privacy provided
by the Alaska Constitution, the court held that this guarantee does
not include an absolute fundamental privacy right to possess
marijuana.12  It distinguished Breese by clarifying that “[f]ew would
believe they have been deprived of something of critical impor-
tance if deprived of marijuana, though they would if stripped of
control over their personal appearance.”13
Although the Ravin court refused to recognize a general right
of privacy to possess marijuana, it did single out possession in the
home as deserving special consideration.14  The court reasoned that
“[i]f there is any area of human activity to which a right to privacy
pertains more than any other, it is the home.”15  In support of this
view, the court cited portions of the federal Bill of Rights,16 various
Alaska statutes,17 and the distinct “character of life” in Alaska.18
5. Id. at 500.
6. 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972).
7. See id. at 166.
8. See id. at 174.
9. Id. at 171.
10. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
11. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 501.
12. See id. at 502.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 502-03.
15. Id. at 503.
16. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 503 (discussing U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, and
V).
17. See id. at n.42 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.35.090 (homestead exemption
to execution sales) (repealed in 1982 and replaced with ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.010
(Michie 1996)), 11.15.100 (justifiable homicide defense for protection of the
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Just a year earlier, in Gray v. State,19 the court already had held
that the Alaska Constitution protects from legislative intrusion
“the ingestion of food, beverages or other substances” in the
home.20  Therefore, it was a fairly modest step in Ravin for the
court to conclude that
the citizens of the State of Alaska have a basic right to privacy in
their homes under Alaska’s constitution.  This right to privacy
would encompass the possession and ingestion of substances
such as marijuana in a purely personal, non-commercial context
in the home unless the state can meet its substantial burden and
show that proscription of possession of marijuana in the home is
supportable by achievement of a legitimate state interest.21
More specifically, the court stated that the state had the “greater
burden of showing a close and substantial relationship between the
public welfare and control of ingestion or possession of marijuana
in the home for personal use.”22
To determine whether the state had met its “substantial bur-
den,” the court proceeded to review the evidence presented at trial
by both parties pertaining to the effects of marijuana use.23  It con-
sidered evidence put forth by the state: that marijuana use dam-
ages the immune system, sexual functioning, and chromosomal
structure; produces an extreme panic reaction; leads to a lack of
motivation; causes violent criminal behavior; results in experimen-
tation with more dangerous drugs; and leads to long-term psycho-
logical problems and addiction.24  However, after conducting a
thorough examination of the scientific evidence behind all of the
state’s arguments, the court concluded the following:
                                                                                                                                
home) (repealed in 1978 and replaced with ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.335 (Michie
1996)), 11.20.080.100 (distinction between burglary of a dwelling and burglary of
other places) (repealed in 1978 and replaced with ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.300
(Michie 1996))).
18. Id. at 504.
19. 525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974).  Gray had been convicted of selling marijuana
in a private place and had made the same constitutional argument as Ravin.  See
id. at 527.  The court held that Gray’s activity was constitutionally protected by
the privacy amendment.  See id.  However, since there had been no evidentiary
hearing regarding the effects of marijuana use, it remanded the case for determi-
nation of whether the statute under which Gray was convicted was “necessary to
further a compelling state interest.”  Id. at 528.  The court observed that it re-
cently had granted review in Ravin and that its decision in that case could control
the final determination of Gray’s claim.  See id. at 528 n.16.
20. Id. at 528.
21. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 504-05.
24. See id. at 506-08.
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It appears that the effects of marijuana on the individual are not
serious enough to justify widespread concern, at least as com-
pared with the far more dangerous effects of alcohol, barbitu-
rates and amphetamines.  Moreover, the current patterns of use
in the United States are not such as would warrant concern that
in the future consumption patterns are likely to change.25
The court emphasized that it did not endorse the choice to possess
or consume marijuana.26  Nevertheless, it ultimately found that “no
adequate justification for the state’s intrusion into the citizen’s
right to privacy by its prohibition of possession of marijuana by an
adult for personal consumption in the home has been shown.”27
In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged that
marijuana use in certain contexts does pose a threat to the general
welfare.28  For instance, the court made clear that the state was still
justified in prohibiting juvenile marijuana use, driving while intoxi-
cated due to marijuana, and private marijuana possession of
amounts indicative of an intent to sell.29  Ultimately, however, it
found that these harms “standing alone” do not create “a close and
substantial relationship between the public welfare and control of
ingestion of marijuana or possession of it in the home for personal
use.”30  In 1982, the Alaska legislature codified Ravin in the state’s
criminal code by legalizing possession in a private place of up to
four ounces of marijuana.31
B. Consideration by Other Courts of the Right to Possess
Marijuana
With the Ravin decision, Alaska became the first state to an-
nounce any constitutionally protected privacy interest in marijuana
possession.32  Federal and state courts have universally rejected
claims that the federal constitution’s due process clause protects
25. Id. at 509-10.
26. See id. at 511-12.
27. Id. at 511.
28. See id.
29. See id.  In a subsequent decision, the court declared that it would provide
no protection for personal marijuana use in public.  See Belgarde v. State, 543
P.2d 206, 207-08 (Alaska 1975).
30. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511.
31. See 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws § 2 ch. 45.
32. But see State v. Kantner, 493 P.2d 306, 313 (Haw. 1972) (Levinson, J., dis-
senting) (stating that a marijuana possession conviction should be reversed be-
cause of a right to privacy); People v. Sinclair, 194 N.W.2d 878, 896 (Mich. 1972)
(Kavanagh, J., concurring) (stating that a marijuana possession conviction should
be reversed because of a right to privacy).
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any right to possess or consume marijuana.33  For instance,
NORML v. Guste, a class action lawsuit, alleged that federal stat-
utes prohibiting possession of marijuana “encroach on constitu-
tionally protected zones of privacy.”34  The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana noted that the asserted
right was distinct from every other Supreme Court decision to
enunciate a zone of privacy:
[Those cases] involved concepts of basic and fundamental rights
such as the right to marry, to bear children, to think and read
what one wishes, to worship God according to the dictate of his
conscience, to acquire useful knowledge. . . .  Plaintiff’s claim in
the present case rests on bare allegations of a general right to
privacy to do what one wishes in his own home and with his own
body.35
The court found implausible the contention that such a broad right
should be construed from the line of Supreme Court decisions im-
plicating due process concerns.36  Accordingly, it held that “[t]he
right of [the] plaintiff to possess marijuana in his own home can
under no factual or legal interpretation be classified as fundamen-
tal or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”37
Aside from the federal claim made in Guste, courts in states
other than Alaska have considered whether their state constitu-
tions protect marijuana possession, but none has come to the same
conclusion as Ravin.38  Most of these courts distinguished Ravin
33. See, e.g., NORML v. Guste, 380 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. La. 1974); State v.
Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Ariz. 1977); Kreisher v. State, 319 A.2d 31, 32 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1974); Laird v. State, 342 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. 1977); Borras v. State,
229 So.2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1969); Blincoe v. State, 204 S.E.2d 597, 599 (Ga. 1974);
State v. Renfro, 542 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Haw. 1975); State v. Baker, 535 P.2d 1394,
1399 (Haw. 1975); State v. Kincaid, 566 P.2d 763, 765 (Idaho 1977); State v.
O’Bryan, 531 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Idaho 1975); NORML v. Scott, 383 N.E.2d 1330,
1332-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); State v. Chrisman, 364 So.2d 906, 907 (La. 1978);
Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., 375 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Mass. 1978); Commonwealth v.
Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898, 903-04 (Mass. 1969); People v. Alexander, 223 N.W.2d 750,
752 (Mich. App. 1974); State v. Kells, 259 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Neb. 1977); State v.
Nugent, 312 A.2d 158, 162 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); Miller v. State, 458
S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); State v. Anderson, 558 P.2d 307, 309
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976); State ex rel. Scott v. Conaty, 187 S.E.2d 119, 123 (W.Va.
1972).
34. Guste, 380 F. Supp. at 405.
35. Id. at 407.
36. See id. at 406-07.
37. Id. at 407.
38. See, e.g., Murphy, 570 P.2d at 1073; Laird, 342 So. 2d at 965; Renfro, 542
P.2d at 368-69; Baker, 535 P.2d at 1399-1400; Kincaid, 566 P.2d at 765; Scott, 383
N.E.2d at 1333-34; Anderson, 558 P.2d at 309-10.
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because their state’s constitution, unlike Alaska’s, did not contain
any specifically enumerated right to privacy.39  States that do have
privacy provisions in their constitution have looked at the reason-
ing of the Ravin court but determined that it did not apply in their
jurisdiction.40
In State v. Baker, a decision announced just fifteen days be-
fore Ravin, the Hawaii Supreme Court declined to interpret the
privacy provision of the Hawaii Constitution so as to protect
marijuana possession as a fundamental right.41  The Baker court
correctly predicted that the Alaska Supreme Court’s opinion in
Gray would lead to its ultimate holding in Ravin.42  However, the
court went on to say that
if we so viewed the Hawaii Constitution it would take away from
our food and drug laws the presumption of constitutionality and
require the showing of a compelling state interest before any of
them could be enforced.  We find nothing in our constitution or
its history that leads to that conclusion.43
While declining to specifically discuss the differences between its
constitution and Alaska’s, the court was confident in its conclusion
that the privacy provisions in the two documents should be inter-
preted differently.44
In State v. Murphy, the Arizona Supreme Court was asked to
interpret the privacy provision of the Arizona Constitution within
a similar context.45  While noting the holding in Ravin,46 the Ari-
zona court held that its constitutional privacy provision
goes only to the power of the police to enter a home in search of
evidence of [a] crime.  The right to possess marijuana in a per-
son’s own home is not a basic constitutional right and is not, we
39. See, e.g., Kincaid, 566 P.2d at 765; Laird, 342 So.2d at 965; Anderson, 558
P.2d at 309.
40. See, e.g., Murphy, 570 P.2d at 1072; Baker, 535 P.2d at 1399-1400.
41. See Baker, 535 P.2d at 1399-1400.  The privacy clause of the Hawaii Con-
stitution reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy
shall not be violated.”  HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7.
42. Baker, 535 P.2d at 1400.
43. Id.
44. See id.  The Alaska privacy provision is a more general recognition of “the
right of the people to privacy,” while the Hawaii provision is similar in language
to the first half of the Fourth Amendment except that it adds a right against
“invasions of privacy.”  Compare ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 with HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 7.
45. See Murphy, 570 P.2d at 1072.  The Arizona Constitution states: “No per-
son shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without author-
ity of law.”  ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8.
46. See Murphy, 570 P.2d at 1072.
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believe, made so by invocation of the right of privacy provisions
of the Arizona Constitution.47
In making its decision, the Arizona court did not state whether it
believed that the Ravin court was flatly wrong, or whether signifi-
cant differences in the constitutional traditions of the two states
required a different result.48
III.  IMPORTANCE OF RAVIN TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. “New Judicial Federalism”
The Ravin decision has been described by at least one com-
mentator as “a leading example of the use a state court can make
of its own constitution.”49  The movement to call for expansive use
of state constitutions, or “New Judicial Federalism,”50 is often
traced to a highly influential law review article written by Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., in 1977.51  In that article, Justice Brennan
recounted the impressive extent to which the Warren-era Supreme
Court applied the Bill of Rights guarantees to the states.52  He also
lamented the fact that since 1969, the Court largely had halted the
expansion of constitutional protections and even had withdrawn
them to a degree.53  Accordingly, Brennan’s thesis was that
state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens
the full protections of the federal Constitution.  State constitu-
tions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections of-
ten extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of federal law.  The legal revolution which has
brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the
independent protective force of state law – for without it, the full
realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.54
Brennan’s point is that state courts, when interpreting language in
their state constitutions that is identical to language in the United
States Constitution, should not blindly follow the Supreme Court’s
47. Id. at 1073.
48. See id. at 1072 (noting that Arizona’s privacy clause is similar to that of
many other states, and remarking that “Alaska stands alone”).
49. A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of
the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 933 (1976).
50. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761, 762 n.4 (1992) (discussing background of the expression “New
Judicial Federalism”).
51. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
52. See id. at 493-95.
53. See id. at 495-98.
54. Id. at 491.
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interpretation but should instead conduct an independent analysis
and expand the rights protected by the state constitution if appro-
priate.
B. Ravin’s Role in Alaska’s Constitutional Development
Examples of the type of state expansion on federal constitu-
tional protection that Justice Brennan called for are abundant,55
and the Alaska Supreme Court has been recognized as one of the
leaders in this trend.56  As far back as 1970, the Alaska Supreme
Court noted that
[w]hile we must enforce the minimum constitutional standard
imposed upon us by the United States Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are free, and we are
under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and
privileges under our Alaska Constitution if we find such funda-
mental rights and privileges to be within the intention and spirit
of our local constitutional language and to be necessary for the
kind of civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core of
our constitutional heritage.  We need not stand by idly and pas-
sively, waiting for constitutional direction from the highest court
of the land.  Instead, we should be moving concurrently to de-
velop and expound the principles embedded in our constitutional
law.57
Ronald L. Nelson has well-documented the “constitutional dis-
course” that the Alaska Supreme Court subsequently developed to
interpret the state constitution.58  His extensive analysis led him to
55. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (holding that the state
constitution’s equal protection clause requires equity in state public school fund-
ing, despite the United State Supreme Court’s holding in San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)); District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. v.
Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980) (holding that Massachusetts Constitution’s
ban against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (holding a statute that pro-
hibited same-gender sexual relations violated the state constitution, despite the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), that such a statute would not violate federal constitutional principles).
56. See Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last Frontier,” Professor Gardner:
Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA
L. REV. 1 (1995).
57. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970) (citations
omitted).
58. See Nelson, supra note 56, at 11.  Nelson’s article is an attempt to refute
James A. Gardner’s argument that
the tension between state and national constitutionalism has been
largely resolved in the modern day United States by the collapse of
meaningful state identity and the coalescence of a social consensus that
fundamental values in this country will be debated and resolved on a na-
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opine: “Alaska’s state constitutional decisions – particularly in the
areas of equal protection, privacy, freedom of religion and natural
resources – have something worth saying and hearing.”59
In the Alaska Supreme Court’s evolving interpretation of the
privacy amendment to the Alaska constitution, Ravin is considered
a landmark decision.60  It was the first Alaska Supreme Court
opinion that required serious consideration of the privacy amend-
ment and the resulting interpretation truly gave the amendment
meaning.61  The principle it establishes – that the privacy amend-
ment can be used to provide more protection than the federal con-
                                                                                                                                
tional level.  Thus, regardless of whether such regional differences ex-
isted in the past, they no longer exist and we may for the most part dis-
regard them as viable elements of state constitutional discourse.
Gardner, supra note 50, at 828.  Even if regional values are critical to American’s
identities, Gardner further contends that state constitutions are so muddled that
they do not actually reflect local values.  See id. at 818-22.  The result is that state
courts
by and large have little interest in creating the kind of state constitu-
tional discourse necessary to build an independent body of state consti-
tutional law. . . .  In the few cases in which courts hold the state and fed-
eral constitutions to be distinct, they often seem to have done so in a
way that is so idiosyncratically result-oriented as to provide little basis
for further intelligible debate about the nature of the differences be-
tween the two documents that account for the court’s departure from
federal norms.
Id. at 804.  Gardner’s ultimate thesis is that New Judicial Federalists are wrong in
both their view that state constitutional decision-making is an important part of
protecting liberties and in their belief that courts are actually making informed
state constitutional decisions.  See id.
Nelson’s retort to this argument is that “Alaska’s physical and demographic
differences are part of a background that distinguishes it from the other forty-nine
states.  These differences are of such a magnitude as to render suspect Professor
Gardner’s claim that significant local variation in America is implausible.”  Nel-
son, supra note 56, at 6.  His article then highlights the various areas in which the
Alaska Supreme Court has developed an independent and coherent constitu-
tional analysis.  See id. at 11-32.
59. Nelson, supra note 56, at 11.
60. See, e.g., Susan Orlansky & Jeffrey M. Feldman, Justice Rabinowitz and
Personal Freedom: Evolving a Constitutional Framework, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 1,
12 (1998) (“Ravin, like Breese, has been cited frequently [by the Alaska Supreme
Court] in cases involving issues of privacy and personal freedom.  The balancing
analysis that Justice Rabinowitz elucidated in Ravin is employed in virtually all of
those cases.”).  See also John F. Grossbauer, Note, Alaska’s Right to Privacy Ten
Years After Ravin v. State: Developing a Jurisprudence of Privacy, 2 ALASKA L.
REV. 159 (1985).
61. See Grossbauer, supra note 60, at 160.
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stitution – has become a standard of Alaska’s constitutional inter-
pretation.62
C. Ravin as a Model State Constitutional Decision
In addition to its significance to the development of Alaska’s
constitutional interpretation of the right to privacy, the Ravin deci-
sion is, in many ways, a model state constitutional interpretation in
that it evades some of the common criticisms of New Judicial Fed-
eralism.63  One such criticism is that state constitutional decisions
are frequently ambiguous as to whether they are based on state or
federal grounds.64  Ravin clearly states that its holding is based
solely on state constitutional grounds.65
Another frequent criticism of New Judicial Federalism is that
state constitutional decisions seldom refer to local values and illu-
minate why a unique interpretation of the state constitution is nec-
essary.66  But the Ravin court was careful to note that the court’s
interpretation of the Alaska Constitution
is consonant with the character of life in Alaska.  Our territory
and now state has traditionally been the home of people who
62. See, e.g., Valley Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d
963 (Alaska 1997) (holding that the privacy amendment protects reproductive
freedom more broadly than the federal constitution); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872
(Alaska 1978) (holding that the privacy amendment protects against warrantless
recording of conversations although the federal constitution does not).
63. This is perhaps why some scholars critical of New Judicial Federalism
have remained reluctant to criticize Ravin.  See, e.g., Cathleen C. Herasimchuk,
The New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1514 n.143 (1990); Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of
State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 1021 (1985).
64. The United States Supreme Court is the most prominent of these critics.
The Court has pronounced that if
a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to
be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and inde-
pendence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of
the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the
state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that fed-
eral law required it to do so.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).  The result is that state courts
that wish to decide a case based on the state constitution but still comment on the
federal constitutional claim must be very careful, or they will risk what they
thought was a decision of state law being reviewed by the Supreme Court.  See,
e.g., Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Com-
ment on Federal Constitutional Issues when Disposing of Cases on State Constitu-
tional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1985).
65. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
66. See Gardner, supra note 50, at 778-805.
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prize their individuality and who have chosen to settle or to con-
tinue living here in order to achieve a measure of control over
their own lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many
of our sister states.67
Striking a similar note, Justice Boochever, in his concurrence to
Ravin, found that Alaska’s historically “strong emphasis on indi-
vidual liberty”68 required a broad interpretation of the privacy
amendment.69  Thus, Ravin was consciously grounded in local val-
ues and cannot be easily criticized as arbitrary.70  In sum, Ravin is
one of the foremost New Judicial Federalist decisions.
IV.  THE VOTER INITIATIVE OF 1990:
ALASKA VOTERS STRIKE BACK
A. The Voter Initiative of 1990
In the years following the Ravin decision, Alaska gained a
somewhat misleading national reputation for having legalized
marijuana use.  Public response to this newfound reputation came
in the form of a voter initiative designed to re-criminalize mari-
juana.  The Voter Initiative of 1990 (the “Initiative”) that re-
criminalized marijuana possession and directly challenged Ravin
passed by approximately a fifty-five percent margin and became
effective on March 3, 1991.71  The initiative stated:
Under Alaska law it is currently legal for adults over 18 years old
to possess under four ounces of marijuana in a home or other
private place.  The penalty for adults over 18 years old for pos-
sessing less than one ounce in public is a fine of up to $100.  This
67. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1974).
68. Id. at 514 (Boochever, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 514-15 (Boochever, J., concurring).
70. The reliance that the court placed on distinct Alaskan values also helps
explain how the Ravin court reached a different result than the Hawaii and Ari-
zona Supreme Courts even though all three constitutions specifically enumerate
privacy as a right.  See supra notes 41-48.  There is nothing unsettling about the
fact that the courts of different states reach contradictory results in the face of
similarly worded constitutional provisions as long as the decisions are actually
grounded in unique state values that merit a separate outcome.
71. See Mowing the Grass (Alaska Recriminalizes Possession of Marijuana),
TIME, Nov. 19, 1990, at 47.  In the months preceding the election, the issue be-
came highly politicized and gained a good deal of publicity.  The Initiative was
preceded by “fifteen years of lobbying by federal government drug warriors.”
Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition: An Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN. L. REV. 571,
601 n.115 (1995).  Drug czar Bill Bennett even traveled to Alaska to campaign on
its behalf.  See Bennett Urges Alaska Voters to Ban Marijuana, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
27, 1990, at 21.
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initiative would change Alaska’s laws by making all such posses-
sion of marijuana criminal, with possible penalties of up to 90
days in jail and/or up to a $1000 fine.72
By explicitly criminalizing possession of marijuana in a private
place, the Initiative in no uncertain terms attempted to invalidate
the supreme court’s decision in Ravin.  After the Initiative passed,
Alaska Statutes section 11.71.060 was duly amended so as again to
make four ounces or less of marijuana in a private place illegal.73
The passage of the Initiative created an interesting constitu-
tional issue – whether such an initiative actually had the legal
power to “overrule” Ravin.  Other states have successfully used a
voter referendum or legislation to invalidate an undesirable inter-
pretation of a state constitution.74  However, the typical route is for
the legislature directly to amend the state constitution.  In contrast,
the Initiative merely altered the general Alaska Criminal Code,
not the Alaska Constitution itself.  Nevertheless, media and popu-
lar reports overlooked the constitutional issue and declared that
Alaska voters had “recriminalized the possession of small amounts
of marijuana.”75  Somewhat surprisingly, even legal experts gener-
ally accepted the view that “the people of [Alaska] overturned [the
Ravin] decision by ballot initiative.”76
The civil libertarian group Alaskans for Privacy filed a lawsuit
soon after the Initiative was passed, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the Initiative was unconstitutional.77  The group peti-
tioned for summary judgment, contending that “the scientific and
medical data has remained relatively unchanged since 1975.”78  The
state moved to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming that “current medical
and scientific information about [marijuana] shows that the facts
have changed since 1975.”79  Judge Hunt held that
[t]he disputed evidence submitted to this court raises genuine is-
sues of material fact as to whether the current medical and scien-
72. Alaskans for Privacy v. State, No. 3AN-91-1746, slip op. at 11 (D. Alaska
Jan. 21, 1992).
73. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 (Michie 1996).
74. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 150-54 (1990).
75. Richard Mauer, Voters Favor Pot Law: Recriminalization Lead by 10,000,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 7, 1990, at B1.
76. Gardner, supra note 50, at 828 n.283; see also M. Kathryn Bradley &
Deborah L. Williams, “Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Alaska. . .” – A
Practitioner’s Guide to Alaska’s Initiative Law, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 279, 280 n.3
(1992); Duke, supra note 71, at 601 n.115.
77. See Alaskans for Privacy v. State, No. 3AN-91-1746, at 1.
78. Id. at 13.
79. Id. at 12.
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tific data supports or contradicts the factual information avail-
able to the Supreme Court in 1975.  A hearing before the court
will be necessary to resolve the factual issues which the parties
agree will determine whether prohibiting the possession and use
of marijuana by adults in the privacy of their home violates the
Alaska [C]onstitution.80
Accordingly, she denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion
for summary judgment and ordered an evidentiary hearing to de-
termine the scientific evidence regarding marijuana use.81 The
Alaskans for Privacy did not have the funding to conduct such a
hearing, however, and the lawsuit was dropped.82
B. State v. McNeil
In 1993, the issue resurfaced when a criminal case in Ketchi-
kan directly confronted the Initiative’s constitutionality.83  In State
v. McNeil, a police officer noticed evidence of marijuana posses-
sion through the window of the defendant’s home.84  The officer
obtained a warrant, searched the defendant’s residence, and dis-
covered .21 grams of marijuana.85  Seven months later, McNeil was
charged with possession of marijuana.86  Because the “[d]efendant
[was] an adult, . . . the residence was his home, . . . and the amount
and circumstances certainly suggest only personal use,” the case
required the judge to reconcile Ravin with the Initiative.87
After considering the issue, Judge Thompson concluded that
the Initiative did not impact the validity of the Ravin decision.  He
stated that
Ravin was founded in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Alaska Constitution.  The legislature – nor for that matter the
people through the initiative – cannot “fix” what is disliked in an
interpretation of that document by legislation.  The only way to
“fix” the constitution is by the amendment process or a new con-
vention.  The initiative was inadequate to overrule Ravin and
that case remains the law.88
The judge went on to say that Ravin would be inapplicable if the
factual findings upon which it was premised were no longer accu-
80. Id. at 13.
81. See id.
82. Interview with William P. Bryson, Attorney for Alaskans for Privacy,
Mar. 18, 1998, Anchorage, Alaska.
83. See State v. McNeil, No. 1KE-93-947 (D. Alaska Oct. 29, 1993).
84. See id. at 1.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1-2.
87. Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 5.
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rate.89  However, the prosecution in McNeil presented no evidence
to suggest that new scientific data regarding the effects of mari-
juana invalidated the basis for the Ravin decision.90  Therefore,
Judge Thompson felt he had “no basis to overrule or even qualify
the Ravin decision” and he dismissed the charges against McNeil.91
As a legal matter, McNeil was correct in deeming the Initia-
tive irrelevant.  The Alaska Constitution is the fundamental law of
Alaska and all other state laws gain their legitimacy from that
charter.  The Alaska Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of
the Alaska Constitution,92 and, in Ravin, it made a specific inter-
pretation as to what the constitutional privacy right encompasses.
It is axiomatic that neither a voter initiative, nor any other legisla-
tion short of a constitutional amendment, can undo the legal effect
of Ravin.
C. City of Boerne v. Flores: An Analogy to Federal Constitutional
Law
An analogous situation at the federal level was recently de-
cided by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores.93  In that
case, the Court was required to determine the constitutionality  of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).94  RFRA was
passed by Congress in specific response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,95 a decision that sharply
redefined the scope of First Amendment protection for religious
acts that violate a generally applicable criminal law.96  RFRA es-
sentially attempted to reinstate the standard that had been applied
by the Court before Smith.97  In response to RFRA, the Court in
City of Boerne stated that “[t]he judicial authority to determine the
constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies, is based on the
premise that the ‘powers of the legislature are defined and limited;
89. See id. at 5-6.
90. See id. at 6.
91. Id.
92. See Boucher v. Bumhoff, 495 P.2d 77, 79 (Alaska 1972) (“[T]he task of
expounding upon fundamental constitutional law and its application to disputes
between various segments of government and society rests with the judicial
branch of government.”).
93. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), on remand, 119 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1997).
94. See id. at 2160.
95. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
96. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160-61.
97. See id.
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and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the consti-
tution is written.’”98
While recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment gives
Congress the power to enforce constitutional violations by the
states, the Court held that RFRA goes beyond mere enforcement
and unconstitutionally purports “to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation.”99  Just as RFRA illegitimately attempted
to interpret the federal constitution, the Initiative illegitimately at-
tempted to interpret the Alaska Constitution.  Judge Thompson
accurately recognized this illegitimacy and properly held that the
Initiative could not be used to convict McNeil.  The appropriate
way for the citizens of Alaska to directly recriminalize marijuana is
not by a voter initiative but by a constitutional amendment.100
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN APPLYING THE RAVIN TEST
As both Alaskans for Privacy and McNeil point out, the Initia-
tive is constitutional only if Ravin should be overruled, either on
legal or factual grounds.  The recent Alaska Supreme Court opin-
ion in Valley Hospital Association, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coalition for
Choice101 highlights the court’s continued commitment to an inter-
pretation of the privacy amendment that “provides more protec-
tion of individual privacy rights than the United States Constitu-
tion.”102  Since Ravin is the cornerstone of this interpretation,103 it is
98. Id. at 2162 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
99. Id. at 2164.
100. In Alaska, the constitution can be amended by an affirmative two-thirds
vote in both legislative houses followed by an affirmative majority vote in a
popular election.  See ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1.  Before the Voter Initiative
passed, there had been several unsuccessful attempts in the state legislature to
initiate a constitutional amendment that would have overruled Ravin.  See Mauer,
supra note 75, at B1.
101. 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
102. Id. at 968.  In Valley Hospital, the court was required to determine the
constitutionality of a publicly supported hospital’s policy of prohibiting all elec-
tive abortions on its premises.  The court examined the federal standard and
found that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey, “[a]rguably the prevailing federal view is that a state may regulate abortions
so long as their regulation does not impose ‘an undue burden on a woman’s abil-
ity’ to decide to have an abortion.”  Id. at 966 (quoting Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875 (1992)).  Nevertheless, the court held that the Alaska
Constitution protects reproductive rights according to the broad Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), standard rather than the more cramped Casey standard.
Valley Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 948 P.2d at 966-67 (discussing Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 and
Roe, 410 U.S. at 155).
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extremely unlikely that the court would be willing to take a more
narrow view of the privacy amendment that would no longer in-
clude protection for the private possession of marijuana.  On the
other hand, Ravin’s findings of fact regarding the danger that
marijuana use poses to the public welfare are now twenty-three
years old.  As Judge Thompson said in McNeil, “Science marches
on.  Perhaps there is now evidence to persuade the Court that the
State does have an adequate justification to intrude on individual
privacy.”104  In McNeil, the state did not argue the issue.105  How-
ever, if the state faces another Ravin defense, it is sure to make this
contention forcefully.  Therefore, it is important to keep in mind
several principles that the Alaska Supreme Court is likely to in-
voke if it is required to apply the Ravin test.
A. Preference for Autonomy
If an Alaska court reconsiders whether the privacy amend-
ment protects the right to possess marijuana in private, it will apply
the “close and substantial relationship” test that was developed in
Ravin.106  In applying the Ravin test, it is important to keep in mind
the Alaska Supreme Court’s view that
the authority of the state to exert control over individuals ex-
tends only to activities of the individual which affect others or
the public at large as it relates to matters of public health or
safety, or to provide for the general welfare.  We believe this
tenet to be basic to a free society.  The state cannot impose its
own notions of morality, propriety, or fashion on individuals
when the public has no legitimate interest in the affairs of those
individuals.107
                                                                                                                                
The Valley Hospital court also considered an argument that the legislative
history of the privacy amendment limits it to “protection from unwarranted sur-
veillance and data collection by the State and private businesses.”  Id. at 969.
However, after reviewing the scarce evidence available, the court concluded that
“[t]he legislative history is insufficient to limit the general language of the privacy
amendment.”  Id.  This conclusion is consistent with previous Alaska Supreme
Court decisions pointing out the lack of history associated with the privacy
amendment.  See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978); Gray v. State, 525
P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974).  Because of this lack of history, and the broad language
employed by the amendment, it is fair for the court to assume that the legislature
intended for courts to have wide leeway in determining the scope of the amend-
ment.
103. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
104. State v. McNeil, No. 1KE-93-947, slip op. at 6 (D. Alaska Oct. 29, 1993).
105. See id.
106. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1975).
107. Id. at 509.
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However, the court’s position is not unabashedly libertarian – it
added that “[t]he right of the individual to do as he pleases is not
absolute, of course: it can be made to yield when it begins to in-
fringe on the rights and welfare of others.”108  Furthermore, the in-
fringement does not have to be “present and immediate.”109  In the
instance of drug use, the Ravin court speculated that “a drug could
so seriously develop in its user a withdrawal or amotivational syn-
drome, that widespread use of the drug could significantly debili-
tate the fabric of our society.”110  So, in attempting to demonstrate
a “close and substantial relationship” between marijuana use and
the public welfare, the state may point to evidence of the long-
term harmful health effects of marijuana.111  However, to meet its
burden the state always must tie these effects to the public welfare
in general; it does not have the authority to invade privacy merely
to “protect the individual from his own folly.”112
B. Requirement of a Definite Threat to the Public Welfare
In applying the Ravin test, Alaska courts should remember
that the state may not rely on hypothesis, mere potential risks, or
speculation.113  Under typical scrutiny, “[t]here is a presumption in
favor of public health measures; when there is substantial doubt as
to the safety of a given substance or situation for the public health,
controls intended to obviate the danger will usually be upheld.”114
There is no presumption of validity, however, when the public
health regulation in question directly implicates a constitutional
right.115  When it comes to state regulations that intrude upon the
privacy of the home, “mere scientific doubts will not suffice.  The
state must demonstrate a need based on proof that the public
health or welfare will in fact suffer if the controls are not ap-
plied.”116
Alaska appellate courts have applied the Ravin test to other
drugs twice: once to cocaine and once to alcohol.117  In State v. Er-
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 508.
113. See id. at 511.
114. Id. at 510.
115. See id. at 511.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Alaska appellate courts also have invoked Ravin twice in deciding weap-
ons possession cases.  See Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Alaska Ct. App.
1997) (holding that “[t]he potential for harm to health and safety resulting from
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ickson,118 the defendants argued that, under the rules established in
Ravin, they had a privacy right to possess cocaine within their own
home.119  The Alaska Supreme Court looked at the scientific evi-
dence regarding cocaine use and concluded that “there is a suffi-
ciently close and substantial relationship between the means cho-
sen to regulate cocaine and the legislative purpose of preventing
harm to health and welfare so as to justify the prohibition of use of
cocaine, even in the home.”120  After examining the scientific evi-
dence, the court distinguished Ravin, saying that they found “no
authorities which state that the effects of cocaine are less harmful
than marijuana, and it seems clear that cocaine is substantially
more of a threat to health and welfare.”121  Among the factors that
swayed the court were the possibility of an acute cocaine overdose,
the chronic physical and psychological effects of cocaine use, and
the correlation between cocaine use and the propensity to commit
crime and violence.122
In Harrison v. State,123 the Alaska Court of Appeals applied
the Ravin “close and substantial relationship” test when it faced
the issue of whether a village may constitutionally proscribe the
importation of alcohol.124  Among defendant Harrison’s arguments
was that the restriction violated his Ravin privacy right to consume
alcohol in the home.125  Although Harrison was convicted of im-
porting alcohol into the community, the court agreed with him that
“[s]ince there is a strong, if not direct, relationship between regu-
lating importation of alcohol and regulating consumption of alco-
hol, . . . we must more closely examine the right to privacy asserted
in this case.”126  Nevertheless, the court found that the state had
                                                                                                                                
the possession and use of firearms by intoxicated persons in their homes” permits
a blanket prohibition on the use of firearms while intoxicated); State v. Weaver,
736 P.2d 781, 783 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the state may proscribe
completely possession of gravity knives because “[s]ubstantial risk of harm to
others and the furtherance of crime result from private possession of such weap-
ons” (quoting legislative history)).
118. 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
119. See id. at 21.  Actually, the case involved seven defendants, who were all
convicted for either selling or possessing cocaine in various places.  See id. at 3
n.6.  Hence, only some of the defendants were eligible to make a privacy claim.
120. Id. at 22.
121. Id. at 21.
122. See id. at 22.
123. 687 P.2d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
124. See id. at 336-37.  The village voted to prohibit the sale and importation of
alcohol consistent with a local option statute passed by the Alaska legislature.
See id. at 335-36.
125. See id. at 336.
126. Id. at 338.
ANDREW.QUALITY.DOC 11/23/98  3:49 PM
334 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [15:2
“unmistakably established a correlation between alcohol consump-
tion and poor health, death, family violence, child abuse, and
crime.”127  Based on this evidence, it held that the state had met its
burden of demonstrating a justification for flatly proscribing alco-
hol.128  The Harrison court also cited specific Alaska Supreme
Court statements indicating that alcohol use was significantly more
threatening to the public welfare than marijuana use.129
C. Stare Decisis
A final factor to consider if the Ravin test is re-applied to the
issue of marijuana is the important judicial principle of stare deci-
sis.  The principle of stare decisis holds that, in deciding whether to
overrule precedent, there should be a strong preference for main-
taining the current rule.130  As stated by the United States Supreme
Court, “the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own
Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for
precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”131  In applying the prin-
ciple of stare decisis, the Alaska Supreme Court has held consis-
tently that “[w]e do not lightly overrule our past decisions.”132  A
previous decision should be overruled only if the court is “clearly
convinced the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound
because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm
would result from a departure from precedent.”133
VI.  NEW EVIDENCE REGARDING THE EFFECTS
OF MARIJUANA USE?
Because the constitutionality of the Voter Initiative hinges on
whether contemporary scientific evidence still shows marijuana to
be relatively harmless, an extensive analysis of that evidence is ap-
propriate to determine whether Ravin should be overruled on fac-
tual grounds. Throughout the twentieth century, there have been
claims that marijuana use causes such undesirable behavior as psy-
chosis and violent criminal rampages as well as more mundane so-
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See Harrison, 687 P.2d at 338-39 (citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 509-
10 (Alaska 1975); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 22 (Alaska 1978)).
130. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854
(1992).
131. Id.
132. State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 610 (Alaska 1986); see also State v. Sum-
merville, 948 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1997).
133. Dunlop, 721 P.2d at 610 (quoting Souter v. State, 606 P.2d 399, 400
(Alaska 1980)).
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cial ills like laziness and general immorality.134  The Ravin court ac-
knowledged many of these alleged dangers but dismissed the evi-
dence as either inaccurate or inconclusive.135  If the state today can
show that the Ravin court was misled, and that scientific research
since 1975 has conclusively demonstrated even a small fraction of
the alleged dangers of marijuana use, then it has a much stronger
argument for justifying complete prohibition.  However, a review
of the current evidence indicates that there are no newly discov-
ered dangers of marijuana use that should compel the court to rule
differently.  Although many people still believe marijuana use has
a devastating impact on society,136 a recent book-length, compre-
hensive examination of the research by Lynn Zimmer, a sociolo-
gist, and John P. Morgan, a medical doctor, demonstrates that this
is not the generally accepted view within the scientific commu-
nity.137  On the contrary, many medical experts, as well as legal
scholars, policy analysts, and social scientists, maintain that there is
no reliable evidence showing marijuana has an adverse effect on
health,138 or leads to dangerous or antisocial behavior.139  While the
134. See generally JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF
MARIJUANA (1983) (discussing the history of marijuana control in the United
States in the twentieth century).
135. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 505-08.
136. See, e.g., Congressional Testimony of Barry R. McCaffrey, Office of the
National Drug Control Policy, to the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee
on Crime (1997 WL 14151535, Oct. 1, 1997).
137. See LYNN ZIMMER & JOHN P. MORGAN, MARIJUANA MYTHS, MARIJUANA
FACTS: A REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1997).
138. See, e.g., In re Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, No. 86-22 (Francis L.
Young, Drug Enforcement Agency Administrative Law Judge, Sept. 6, 1988), re-
printed in MARIJUANA, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW  440 (R.C. Randall ed., 1989)
(“[M]arijuana is far safer than many foods we commonly consume. . . .  Mari-
juana, in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeutically active substances
known to man.”); STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA’S LONGEST
WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 51 (1993) (“[N]o re-
liable evidence has appeared that [regular, long-term marijuana] use has any ad-
verse effect on [the user’s] physical health.”); LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B.
BAKALAR, MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 234 (1997) (“[T]he evidence
makes it increasingly clear that cannabis is relatively benign.”).
139. See, e.g., GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 138, at 246-47 (“Studies in
the United States find no effects of fairly heavy mari[j]uana use on learning, per-
ception, or motivation over periods as long as a year.”); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
MARIJUANA AND HEALTH 128 (1992) (“Both retrospective and experimental
studies in human beings have failed to yield evidence that marijuana use leads to
increased aggression.”); ZIMMER & MORGAN, supra note 137, at 125 (“None of
the studies suggest that marijuana contributes substantially to highway accidents
or fatalities.”).
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state may be able to present some expert witnesses to testify that
marijuana use is a serious public health threat, it will not be able to
show that this is the accepted view of the scientific community.
A. Health Consequences of Marijuana Use
The Ravin court recognized that one way for the state to
demonstrate a “close and substantial relationship” would be for it
to show that significant health risks arise from marijuana use.140
There are no known instances of a marijuana overdose, and most
researchers believe such acute effects are impossible.141  Research-
ers have devoted a great deal of time and resources investigating a
potential link between marijuana use and long-term health prob-
lems but “the findings are on the whole strikingly reassuring.”142
Although researchers can create some interesting effects in ani-
mals by giving them extremely high doses of THC (the psychoac-
tive compound in marijuana), these types of experiments are not
thought to have direct relevance to humans.143
A study conducted on monkeys, that was made public shortly
after Ravin was decided, has been cited widely as evidence that
marijuana use causes brain damage.144  However, a report issued by
the National Academy of Sciences and commissioned by the Na-
tional Institutes of Health and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services cautioned against interpreting the study as proof that
marijuana causes brain damage.145  A 1991 study of monkeys that
140. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
141. In studies of animals, the hypothetical lethal dose of marijuana was de-
termined to be about 40,000 times the typical.  See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, su-
pra note 138, at 235.  This is much higher than the lethal:typical dose ratio for
most other drugs and foods.  For instance, the lethal dose of alcohol is between
four and ten times the typical dose.  See id. at 236.
142. Id. at 243.
143. See, e.g., ZIMMER & MORGAN, supra note 137, at 108-09 (describing ex-
periments that have impaired animals’ immune systems but only after they were
given daily doses of THC 40, up to 1,000 times the equivalent typical human
dose).
144. See R.G. Heath, Marihuana and Delta-9-THC: Acute & Chronic Effects on
Brain Function of Monkey, in PHARMACOLOGY OF MARIHUANA 345-56 (M.C.
Braude & S. Szara eds. 1976); R.G. Heath et al., Cannabis Sativa: Effects on Brain
Function & Ultrastructure in Rhesus Monkey, 15 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 657-90
(1980).
145. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 139, at 81-82 (noting also that
“the possibility that marijuana may produce chronic, ultra-structural changes in
[the] brain has not been ruled out and should be investigated.”); see also ZIMMER
& MORGAN, supra note 137, at 59-60 (further describing the study’s suspect re-
search methods).
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arguably used better research methods “effectively repudiated all
of [the previous study’s] findings” by detecting “no marijuana-
related brain abnormalities at all.”146  Furthermore, “more modern
brain imaging technologies, such as the CAT scan . . . have found
no evidence of brain damage in human marijuana users, even in
subjects smoking an average of nine marijuana cigarettes per
day.”147
Probably the greatest long-term health threat from marijuana
use is to the pulmonary system (assuming the marijuana is
smoked).148  By way of analogy, scientists have feared that frequent
marijuana smoking over long periods may present similar risks as
tobacco smoking.149 Nevertheless, “[s]o far not a single case of lung
cancer, emphysema, or other significant pulmonary pathology at-
tributable to cannabis use has been reported in the United
States.”150  This is thought to be due to the fact that even heavy
marijuana smokers expose their lungs to far less smoke than to-
bacco smokers151 and, “[f]or all smoking-related diseases, what
matters most is the dose of smoke inhaled over time.”152 Zimmer
and Morgan’s conclusion is thus that “[m]oderate smoking of
marijuana appears to pose minimal danger to the lungs.”153
B. Social Consequences of Marijuana Use
The Ravin court rejected theories that marijuana use results in
violent criminal behavior.154  According to Yale Law professors
Steven B. Duke and Albert C. Gross, the court was correct in its
hesitation to accept this claim: “This baseless nonsense has been
thoroughly repudiated since the 1960s by virtually everyone with
any knowledge of the drug.  No one now claims that marijuana
leads to violence.”155  Studies indicate that marijuana actually has a
tendency to make the user less aggressive.156
The theory that marijuana is a “gateway drug” (i.e., using
marijuana causes the user to experiment with more harmful drugs)
146. ZIMMER & MORGAN, supra note 137, at 60.
147. Id. at 57-58.
148. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 138, at 250.
149. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 139, at 57.
150. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 138, at 250.
151. See id. at 250; ZIMMER & MORGAN, supra note 137, at 113.
152. ZIMMER & MORGAN, supra note 137, at 115.
153. Id. at 112.
154. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 507 (Alaska 1975).
155. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 138, at 45.
156. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 139, at 128; ZIMMER & MORGAN,
supra note 137, at 90-91.
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has been greatly overstated in recent years.  In fact, most people
who use marijuana never use heroin or cocaine.157  While it is true
that nearly everyone who uses heroin and cocaine first tried mari-
juana, this does not prove that the marijuana use caused the
“hard” drug use.158  It merely confirms the obvious – people who
try one illegal drug are more inclined to try other illegal drugs.159
While marijuana use clearly has a demonstrated short-term
impact on memory and cognitive functioning,160 there is little evi-
dence to support the view that there is any long-term damage.
Three well-known studies conducted in Jamaica, Greece, and
Costa Rica found no long-term differences in cognition between
marijuana users and non-users.161  Other studies have claimed dif-
ferences in cognition but found them only in heavy, long-term
smokers.162  Even then, the results were not statistically extraordi-
nary.163  In addition, these studies have been criticized for not
properly controlling for the fact that “high-dose long-term mari-
juana users are rare, . . . tend to be deviant in numerous ways, and
. . . tend to use many other psychoactive drugs in addition to mari-
juana.”164
The Jamaica, Costa Rica, and Greece studies also found that
marijuana use had no detrimental effect on “the will to work or
participate in society.”165  More recent long-term studies conducted
in the United States similarly have failed “to suggest that mari-
juana reduces people’s motivation to work, their employability, or
their capacity to earn wages.”166  Some studies of students have
shown that moderate marijuana users get better grades than non-
users.167  While heavy users perform below the norm, a plausible
explanation is that heavy marijuana use and the poor performance
are both symptoms of more deeply-rooted problems.168
The Ravin court seemed most concerned about heavy mari-
juana users who have a tendency to abuse the drug.169  Like any
157. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 138, at 245.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See ZIMMER & MORGAN, supra note 137, at 72.
161. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 138, at 246.
162. See id.
163. See ZIMMER & MORGAN, supra note 137, at 76-79.
164. Id. at 73.
165. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 138, at 246; see also ZIMMER &
MORGAN, supra note 137, at 65.
166. ZIMMER & MORGAN, supra note 137, at 65.
167. See DUKE & GROSS, supra note 138, at 49.
168. See id.
169. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 507 (Alaska 1975).
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drug, marijuana can be, and is, abused.  However, marijuana lacks
a large potential for abuse and the rate of long-term frequent users
is low.170  The probable explanation for this fact is that marijuana is
not physically addictive, in the sense that even long-time heavy us-
ers who subsequently quit experience only very mild physical
symptoms of withdrawal.171  In fact, two different pharmacologists
recently ranked marijuana as having equal to or less dependence
potential than caffeine, and less dependence potential than nico-
tine, alcohol, heroin, or cocaine.172  Even when marijuana use does
become chronic, an “unhealthy and often unwanted preoccupation
with [the] drug” that has a destructive impact on the user’s life is
less likely to occur than with the chronic use of most other recrea-
tional drugs.173  And, according to Lester Grinspoon,  “[m]ost peo-
ple who develop a dependency on mari[j]uana would also be likely
to develop other dependencies because of anxiety, depression, or
feeling of inadequacy.  The original condition is likely to matter
more in this regard than the attempt to relieve it by means of the
drug.”174  So, while surely marijuana is a problem for some people,
marijuana abuse does not appear to be a problem for society.
C. Harrison and Erickson Distinguished
A look back at the reasoning by which Alaska courts have
permitted the state to fully prohibit cocaine and alcohol confirms
that marijuana, based on what researchers know today, does not
present a similar danger to the public welfare.175  State v. Erick-
son,176 which dealt with cocaine, is distinguishable in that there are
no known instances of an acute overdose from marijuana use and
the chronic physical and psychological effects of marijuana use are
insignificant in comparison with cocaine use.  Harrison v. State,177
which allowed a complete prohibition on alcohol, also is distin-
guished easily because there is no evidence linking marijuana use
to the types of social ills associated with alcohol use.178
Based on what is currently known about marijuana, the state
will have a very difficult time proving that marijuana is so harmful
that it can be constitutionally proscribed.  Today, just as when
170. See ZIMMER & MORGAN, supra note 137, at 27.
171. See id. at 29; GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 138, at 244.
172. See ZIMMER & MORGAN, supra note 137, at 28-29.
173. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 138, at 244.
174. Id. at 244-45.
175. See supra notes 155-74 and accompanying text.
176. 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
177. 687 P.2d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
178. See id. at 335.
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Ravin was decided, there is little concrete data to support the view
that marijuana use creates a substantial danger to the public wel-
fare.179  The Ravin court demanded that if the state is to intrude
into the privacy of the home, it must do so armed with definitive
knowledge that the intrusion is for the good of the public wel-
fare.180  There is no consensus among the scientific community that
marijuana use even presents much of a health threat to the user, let
alone that its private use imposes a clear danger to society as a
whole.181  The state cannot meet its burden, and Ravin is just as fac-
tually valid today as when it was first decided.
VII.   POSSIBLE WAYS TO RECONCILE THE CONFLICT?
A. Judicial Process
Despite the fact that the state likely cannot justify prohibiting
private marijuana possession, the current version of Alaska Stat-
utes section 11.71.060182 has not been struck down and still is nomi-
nally enforced.  The normal channels of the judicial system provide
the most desirable way to resolve a serious issue as to a law’s con-
stitutionality.  Aside from Alaskans for Privacy v. State183 and State
v. McNeil,184 however, there have been no court decisions deter-
mining the proper effect of the Initiative.  And these decisions
have no precedential effect on other courts because they were not
appealed.185
There are a number of possible reasons why the constitution-
ality of a prosecution under the Initiative has not yet been tested in
an appellate court.  One reason is that the Alaska court’s search
and seizure decisions make it difficult to apprehend people who
privately grow marijuana.186  Another reason is that, even if it were
179. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
180. See id.
181. See supra notes 142-74 and accompanying text.
182. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 (Michie 1996).
183. No. 3AN-91-1746 (D. Alaska Jan. 21, 1992).
184. No. 1KE-93-947 (D. Alaska Oct. 29, 1993).
185. See Ostrosky v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Alaska supe-
rior court decisions are not binding on other Alaska superior courts.”).
186. See, e.g., Lloyd v. State, 914 P.2d 1282 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (reversing a
conviction for growing marijuana because there was not enough corroborative
evidence to support the informant affidavit relied upon to acquire the search war-
rant); Carter v. State, 910 P.2d 619 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (reversing a conviction
for growing marijuana because neither anonymous tips to the police nor increased
electricity bills of the accused established enough probable cause to support the
search warrant).
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legally practicable for law enforcement agencies to target private
possession of marijuana, the finite amount of resources available
to those agencies requires them to prioritize the crimes they
choose to investigate vigorously.187  Even when private possession
cases are prosecuted, the usual result is that the defendant ends up
accepting a tempting plea bargain.188  Finally, it is possible that
prosecutors and law enforcement officials intentionally are not
pressing the issue because they recognize that Ravin probably
would be upheld.189
B. Executive Action
Until the current viability of Ravin is tested in the courts, the
executive branch may not be obligated to enforce the Initiative if it
determines that it is unconstitutional.  The Office of Legal Counsel
to the President of the United States has written an opinion dis-
cussing the federal executive branch’s options if it is presented
with an arguably unconstitutional law.190  Although not directly ap-
plicable to Alaska, the O.L.C. opinion is of interest to the Gover-
nor of Alaska if he believes that the Initiative may not be constitu-
tional.
According to the O.L.C. opinion
in serving as the executive created by the Constitution, the
President is required to act in accordance with the laws – in-
cluding the Constitution, which takes precedence over other
forms of law. . . .  The President should presume that enactments
are constitutional.  There will be some occasions, however, when
a statute appears to conflict with the Constitution.  In such cases,
the President can and should exercise his independent judgment
to determine whether the statute is constitutional.191
If the President, after exercising his independent judgment, deter-
mines that a statute is unconstitutional, he should make a predic-
tion as to how the Supreme Court would decide the issue.192  If he
believes the Supreme Court would hold the statute constitutional,
187. See Mowing the Grass (Alaska Re-Criminalizes Possession of Marijuana),
TIME, Nov. 19, 1990, at 47 (“Officials say they will not budget much money for
[the Voter Initiative’s] enforcement, and supporters of the referendum expect the
police to arrest offenders only if they find marijuana in the course of investigating
another incident.”).
188. Telephone interview with Cindy Cooper, Assistant Attorney General for
Alaska, Criminal Division, Jan. 21, 1998.
189. Interview with William P. Bryson, Attorney for Alaskans for Privacy,
Mar. 18, 1998 in Anchorage, Alaska.
190. See 18 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel No. 35 (1994).
191. Id. at 2.
192. See id.
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the President should enforce it despite his personal reservations.193
On the other hand, if he “determines both that a provision would
violate the Constitution and that it is probable that the Court
would agree with him, the President has the authority to decline to
execute the statute.”194
Using the O.L.C. opinion as a model for how the executive
branch of Alaska should treat a potentially unconstitutional law,
the Governor should not be required to enforce the law if he per-
sonally believes it is inconsistent with the Alaska Constitution and
determines that the Alaska Supreme Court would agree.  As of
yet, the executive branch of Alaska has taken no official view as to
the Initiative’s constitutionality.195  When the Initiative first was
proposed, the Alaska Attorney General did observe that,
“[b]ecause this amendment could result in the prosecution of an
individual for the use or display of marijuana in the home, it may
be argued that the measure, if passed, is unconstitutional [because
of the Alaska Supreme Court’s opinion in Ravin].”196  However,
the Attorney General declined to decide at that time whether the
Initiative actually was unconstitutional because “a review of the
substantive constitutionality of a bill . . . must await post-
enactment litigation.”197
The Initiative was enacted eight years ago, and the Alaska ex-
ecutive branch still has not issued any further opinion as to its con-
stitutionality.  If the executive branch believes that the Initiative is
constitutional, the very existence of Ravin demands that it issue an
opinion explaining why the specific holding in Ravin is no longer
applicable to marijuana.198  On the other hand, if the Attorney
General’s office believes that the Initiative is unconstitutional, it
should issue an opinion to that effect.  According to the standards
outlined in the O.L.C. opinion, it then may explicitly decline to en-
force the Initiative to the extent that it requires an invasion of the
privacy of the home.199
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. There is precedent in Alaska for the Attorney General’s office to deter-
mine that an enacted voter initiative is clearly unconstitutional and should not be
enforced.  See 1983 Alaska Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2 (opining that the “Tundra Re-
bellion” voter initiative of 1982 should not be enforced because it unconstitution-
ally delegated ownership of land to the state).
196. 1989 Alaska Op. Atty. Gen. 227.
197. Id.
198. Presumably such an opinion would argue that new evidence as to the ef-
fects of marijuana demonstrate that Ravin’s factual findings are clearly invalid
today.
199. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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C. Legislative Action
The legislature can resolve the situation by re-enacting the
previous codification of Ravin if it so desires.  After two years, the
Alaska legislature is free to alter or repeal a voter initiative at its
discretion.200  There is recent precedent in Arizona of the state leg-
islature almost immediately revoking an approved voter initia-
tive.201  Of course, Alaska voters could resolve the situation by
passing a new initiative invalidating the Voter Initiative of 1990.  A
voter initiative that, among other things, will “unambiguously re-
store adult Alaskans’ rights to marijuana in accordance with the
privacy clause in our state constitution” will appear on the ballot in
the 1998 election.202
VIII.  CONCLUSION
Ravin v. State is one of the landmarks in the Alaska Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the constitutional privacy amendment
passed in 1972.  It is also a key decision in Alaska’s rise to Justice
Brennan’s challenge to the states to “step into the breach [left by
the Supreme Court’s withdrawal of constitutional protection].”203
Alaska has been one of the states to most successfully make use of
its unique identity in interpreting its constitution, and Ravin was
pivotal to this success.
Clearly, Ravin was a politically unpopular decision to many.
It thrust perhaps unwanted national controversy on Alaska, and it
made some Alaskans morally uncomfortable.  Surely, if the justices
who decided Ravin were in the more politically accountable
branches of government, they would have not been so quick to le-
galize small amounts of marijuana for private use.  But, the beauty
of the American system of government is that the judicial branch is
not accountable to the majority, it is accountable to the law – first
and foremost to the Constitution.  The constitutional nature of
American law is anti-democratic in that it thwarts the strict will of
the majority, but this feature of the system was deemed necessary
200. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6.
201. See Shaun McKinnon, Lawmakers Put Medicinal Pot Law on Hold,
ARIZONA DAILY STAR, April 16, 1997, at 1A (reporting that the Arizona legisla-
ture had enacted a law negating the effect of a recently passed voter initiative
(Proposition 200) that allowed doctors to prescribe marijuana, L.S.D., and heroin
for medicinal use).
202. See H. Thompson Prentzel III, Marijuana Initiative Makes Moral, Fiscal
Sense,  ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 10, 1998, at B8 (editorializing in favor of a
voter initiative legalizing drugs for medicinal purposes).
203. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).
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by the founders in order to ensure the rights of unpopular minori-
ties.  Time and time again the founders’ decision has been vindi-
cated as essential to a truly free society.  If allowed to succeed, the
attempt by the voters to invalidate Ravin, while an understandable
political maneuver by a group of concerned citizens, would be a
potentially dangerous trend.  Ravin should stand as good law until
and unless the Alaska Supreme Court decides otherwise.
Ultimately, the limited actual enforcement of private mari-
juana possession means both Ravin and the Initiative that at-
tempted to invalidate it have a great deal of symbolic value.  Ravin
is a symbol that Alaska should be proud to endorse, a symbol of
the value Alaska places on personal autonomy and of the inde-
pendent manner in which Alaska courts will interpret the Alaska
Constitution.
Andrew S. Winters
